Radiated Food and Risk Communication in Post-Fukushima Japan by Walravens, Tine
Dublin Gastronomy Symposium 2020 – Food and Disruption
Radiated Food and Risk Communication in Post-Fukushima Japan
Tine Walravens
Cvetkovich & Roth, 2000). Through dialogue, institutions 
should aim to understand the perceptions and concerns of 
the public, and adjust their risk management strategies 
based on this knowledge, in order to restore public 
confidence and trust (UNFAO, 2003; 2016; Löfstedt, 
2005). Rather than mere dissemination of information or 
normative persuasion, the goal of risk communication is 
thus a two-way process of social learning, aimed at helping 
people make informed decisions (Renn, 2014, p. 1278; 
Siegrist, 2014, p. 1241; Arvai, 2014).
Although not without challenges and problems of its 
own, this form of risk communication, including the 
principles of participation, transparency and 
communicated scientific uncertainty, has thus become the 
standard (FAO 2016, EFSA 2017), to the extent that the 
Japanese government officially signed up in 2004 (Food 
Safety Commission, 2004; 2015). However, as this 
presentation argues, the ostensible use of participatory and 
transparent risk communication is often mere window-
dressing, giving the impression of an open dialogue while 
framing public fears as irrational, or simply wrong.
Drawing on theories and principles of risk 
communication, this presentation analyses how the 
Japanese government sought to restore the notion of ‘safe 
food’ in the uncertain aftermath of the Fukushima 
disaster. For this purpose, it applies a qualitative content 
analysis (Mayring, 2000; Kohlbacher, 2005) on 
representative governmental material for three selected 
case studies of risk communication spanning different 
stages after the disaster (2011-2019); firstly the setting of 
both provisional and adjusted radiation standards, 
secondly the so-called ‘Risk Communicators Programme’ 
and thirdly the efforts of the ‘Fūhyō Higai [harmful 
rumours] Taskforce’.
Conflicting Radiation Standards
Reports of food contamination emerged within a week of 
the onset of the Fukushima disaster. As public anxiety did 
not subside despite governmental reassurances, the need to 
establish and communicate limits for what defined ‘safe 
food’ became apparent. On March 17, 2011, the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued 
Provisional Regulatory Values (PRVs). Given the general 
scientific uncertainty on the subject and the urgency of the 
matter, the Food Safety Commission did not endorse the 
scientific appropriateness of the PRVs (FSC, 2011). 
However, high level governmental representatives kept 
reassuring the public and advocating for solidarity with the 
On the morning of 11 March 2011, a combination of 
earthquake, tsunami and the meltdown of three reactors at 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant hit the 
Northeast of Japan. As radiation from the nuclear disaster 
hit food production nationwide, levels of public anxiety and 
concern mounted. Information on the scale and the extent 
of the radioactive contamination was scarce and often 
contradicting, while food contamination stories popped up 
one after another, triggering mass consumer avoidance. In 
the face of this unprecedented food crisis, ensuring ‘safe 
food’ became urgent priority for the Japanese government.
The Japanese government’s responses to the radiation 
risk after the Triple Disaster sparked much academic 
debate and criticism, specifically from a consumer/citizen 
angle. Governmental risk communication was criticized 
for a strong simplification of the information, the levelling 
out of scientific uncertainty, the normalisation of the 
radiation risk, and its corrective aim in a one-way, top-
down structure. Moreover, its focus on assuring the safety 
of the Japanese food supply and promoting domestic food 
consumption did not suffice in assisting Japanese 
consumers in dealing with daily food safety worries. To the 
contrary, this might even have jeopardized the health of 
Japanese consumers (Kanda et al., 2015; Kimura, 2016, 
2017; Takeda, 2017; Reiher, 2017). Studies on post-
Fukushima risk communication in general have identified 
several consumer expectations towards the government: 
more transparency, a tightening of the gap between experts 
and the general public, and a more citizen-centered 
approach (Figueroa, 2013; Perko, 2016; Kimura, 2017; 
2016; 2015; Reiher, 2017; Takeda, 2017; Yamaguchi, 2016; 
Sternsdorff-Cisterna, 2015).
These findings are in line with the theoretical debate on 
risk communication, food and trust. Until the end of the 
1990s, the conventional approach to risk communication 
was based on the information deficit model. Simply put, 
the public’s lack of knowledge and technical understanding 
was the problem, and this was solved by top-down 
information provision. Experts selected the information 
and assessment deemed necessary, leaving no room for the 
opinions and perceptions of the lay public in this model, 
despite the differing risk assessments on both sides (Slovic, 
1987). As such, the model lent itself to the authorities’ 
attenuating or amplifying risks by the mere selection of 
risks or expert opinions to convey (Renn, 2014, p.1277). 
This model has shown to be ineffective, and risk 
communication, like other forms of strategic 
communication, is now understood to be more effective if 
conceived of as an interactive, dialogic process (Siegrist, 
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and even uses these consumers as a medium of risk 
communication to inform the wider public about food 
risks. However, a closer look at the material used in the 
sessions clearly shows the intention of the program to 
‘correct’ the public’s ‘misunderstanding’ against the 
backdrop of the ‘harmful rumours’-discourse or fūhyō higai 
– referring to the economic impact of rumours harming 
the reputation of Japan’s rural and industrial economies. 
The government’s role in creating this doubt in the first 
place is conspicuous by its mere absence in the material.
A focus on ‘correct information’ reduces the ambiguous 
problem to a reassuringly simple issue, hinting at the 
knowledge deficit model of risk communication that 
presumes the consumer as unknowledgeable in terms of 
scientific matters. The danger is thus not radiation, which 
is clearly under control according to the government. 
Rather, the public’s uncertainty and lack of correct 
knowledge is the real risk in terms of food safety. The 
solution logically lies in educating and informing the 
public and correcting their understanding and behaviour, a 
responsibility which now rests in the hands of the 
participants of the course. At its heart, the RRC program 
was thus really about preventing the so-called ‘harmful 
rumours’ ( fūhyō higai) rather than engaging in meaningful 
state-public dialogue about radiation risks. As such, both 
risk communication and risk management go hand in hand 
here: the radiation risk is managed by communicating the 
‘correct information’. 
The Fūhyō Higai Taskforce battling harmful rumours
From the earliest responses on, the government’s priority 
was thus on preventing damage by so-called rumours, and 
this anti-rumour strategy was quickly integrated into their 
risk communication efforts. With the establishment of the 
Fūhyō Higai Taskforce [Genshiryoku Saigai Fūhyō Higai 
Eikyō Taisaku Task Force] in 2013, the communication 
effort to counter the risk of widespread rumours was put to 
the next gear. The ‘Taskforce to Respond to Effects of 
Harmful Rumours related to the Nuclear Accident’ is part 
of a policy package of the Abe administration, which aims 
to accelerate the reconstruction and revitalisation of the 
Tohoku region after the Fukushima disaster 
(Reconstruction Agency, 2014; Terasako, 2018). In 2019 
still, the most recent campaign material tries to persuade 
its intended audience in the same simplistic way as before: 
Japan’s food radiation standards are ‘the strictest in the 
world’ (Reconstruction Agency, 2018), while consumer 
avoidance is an immoral and selfish act towards the 
affected farmers and the reconstruction of the region.
In line with the official message of control and progress 
touted by PM Abe and his government as the country hosts 
both the Rugby World Cup (2019) and the Summer 
Olympics (2020), food-related risk communication 
increasingly stresses progress and introduces forward-
looking initiatives, while glossing over remaining health 
affected farmers in the Northeast of Japan by not avoiding 
their produce. At the same time, local and national 
politicians’ actions and comments further amplified 
confusion. Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō for example 
appeared on television drinking tap water, the day after 
bottled water was being distributed to residents because of 
the restriction on tap water consumption (ABC News, 
2011). Despite this official reassurance, consumer 
organizations and experts immediately voiced their 
skepticism and criticism towards the legitimacy, 
methodology and the actual implementation of the 
government-set provisional standards. Anxiety among the 
public regarding the food safety situation was high and 
causally related to the PRVs and their doubtful basis.
In order to address this problem of trust, the Japanese 
government announced new -clearly stricter- standards. 
However, despite their announcement in October 2011, 
the new standards would only be effective as of April 2012 
– more than six months later. The poor communication 
and the delayed introduction of these tighter standards left 
the public wondering about the food that they were and 
had been eating so far (Sternsdorff-Cisterna, 2013, 
Kimura, 2016). How could food in October 2011 be 
guaranteed as absolutely safe [anzen], if in April 2012 it 
would no longer be?
Although surely placed in a difficult situation, the initial 
response to the radioactive contamination of food by the 
Japanese authorities was thus not able to do the basics: 
provide the consumer with consistent and simple 
information on how to manage the food risk in their daily 
life. Instead, the response was reactive, inconsistent, and 
confusing, sowing distrust and uncertainty among the 
public and other stakeholders. The later risk 
communication focuses precisely on this public 
uncertainty – rather than on contaminated food – as 
harmful and dangerous to Japanese food consumers and 
producers, without acknowledging the role of the earlier 
contradictory risk communication in creating the 
uncertainty in the first place.
Risk Communicators and ‘Correct Information’
As one response to calls for improved risk communication, 
specifically regarding food, the government initiated a 
program in September 2013 aimed at training citizens as 
certified Radiation Risk Communicators (RRC, Shokuhinchū 
no hōshaseibusshitsu ni kansuru komyunikētā [Communicators 
on Radioactive Substances in Food] (Kimura, 2016, pp. 
58-59). The idea was to educate a group of citizens in food 
and radiation, and they would then spread ‘correct 
information’ (seikakuna jōhō) about the national food 
safety situation and teach their fellow consumers how to 
manage food risk by themselves (CAA, 2013).
At first glance, the RRC program appears to embrace 
and encapsulate modern, participative risk communication: 
the program actively engages in a dialogue with consumers, 
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risks or inconvenient truths (Asahi Shimbun, 2019). While 
the focus on ‘correct information’ dissemination persists, 
the discourse has clearly moved away from the fūhyō higai 
narrative and irrational consumer concerns. At the same 
time, the material hints at a fatigue with the issue of 
radiation, and gives the impression Japan is ready to close 
off this chapter.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this presentation demonstrates how the 
governmental risk communication efforts, although aimed 
at managing the various food risks, actually contributed to 
and intensified public confusion and uncertainty, and as 
such eroded institutional trust in the domestic food 
governance system. Despite this rocky start in the initial 
reaction to the disaster, the food safety authorities have 
acknowledged these failures in terms of risk communication 
and included efforts towards stakeholder participation over 
time. Nevertheless, despite its official subscription to a 
form of ‘interactive’ risk communication which does not 
use ‘the persuasion strategy’ (CAA, 2019), governmental 
campaigns are still symptomatic of old-school conceptualizations 
of risk communication and broader persisting issues within 
the Japanese food governance system.
The most recent intensified communication efforts, 
including much newly published and produced material, 
hint at a wish to close of the Fukushima chapter, maybe 
just in time for the Summer Olympics 2020. 
Unfortunately, recent developments at the plant might 
jeopardize these strategic efforts and the public diplomacy 
efforts pushing the idea that the disaster is ‘under control’ 
might have the opposite effects (Asahi Shimbun, 2019).
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